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I.

INTRODUCTION

Intercollegiate sports is big business.' Collegiate athletic programs, currently
bringing thousands of dollars in profits to many universities, 2 maintain broad-

* Associate, Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson & Casey, Miami,
Florida; B.A. Jacksonville University; J.D. University of Florida.
1. The growth of the entrepreneurial nature of higher education is not limited to intercollegiate sports. Many universities are now beginning to resemble big businesses. See generally Romaner,
Blurring Roles of Universities, Business Studied, Fla. Times-Union Jacksonville J., Mar. 3, 1985, at C
1.
2. Little information is available on specific amounts that athletic programs bring into universities as profits. In 1974, one report disclosed that Notre Dame University's football program
operated at a profit of $2,000,000, and the University of Florida netted $866,000. In 1977, the
average profits generated by a football program in the larger universities was $797,000. Kaplan,
IntercollegiateAthletics and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1430, 1440-41 (1980).
As another example, see 22-Skiddoo: Flighty Over Flutie, SpoRrs ILLUSRATED, Jan. 7, 1985, at 10
(Doug Flutie's beneficial effect on the financial situation of Boston College) [hereinafter cited as
22-Skdoo].
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based budgets' and highly-paid staffs. As with other business enterprises, they
conduct very sophisticated promotional campaigns to exalt their teams.' Their
success can be seen in the number of fans they lure into the stands.5 To continue
attracting these fans, athletic programs pour vast resources into recruiting in
an attempt to attract the best athletes to their schools. 6 As a result, more than
a quarter million students today receive athletic scholarships. 7
Claims that these scholarships produce "pay-for-play" student-athletes8 raise
the possibility that some may consider these grants to be compensation. This
compensatory appearance raises the issue of the appropriate tax treatment of
athletic scholarships under the Internal Revenue Code. Since 1954, the Code
has had a separate provision, section 117, which exempts some scholarships
from taxation. 9 This article analyzes the propriety of excluding athletic scholarships from taxable income under section 117.
Initially, this article focuses on the history of tax treatment of scholarships
and the general provisions which presently control the issue. The various tests
the Internal Revenue Service and the courts have used to determine the applicability of section 117 will then be presented. After an analysis of the treatment
of athletic scholarships under these different tests, it will be demonstrated that
under the present law athletic grants should be subject to taxation. A proposal
will be made, however, that Congress amend section 117 to provide liberal
coverage for these scholarships because of their unique social function.
II.

HISTORY OF

IRS

TREATMENT OF SCHOLARSHIPS

Before Congress enacted the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, no specific
provision treated taxation of scholarship grants.'0 Under the 1939 Code, scholarships were excluded from taxable income only if the grant qualified as a gift."

3. For example, the 1984-85 budget of the athletic program at the University of Florida
calls for $9,586,027 for men's sports and $1,845,936 for women's sports. Of this, more than
$1,300,000 is allotted to the football program. Legislators Back Bill to Aid Women's Athletics, Independent Fla. Alligator, Feb. 26, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
4. See Charitable Contributions: IRS Punts on College Athletic Ruling, 26 TAx NOTES (TAX ANALYsTs), 116, 116-17 (Jan. 14, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Charitable Contributions].
5. See NCAA FOOTBALL TELEVISION COMM., REPORT OF THE 1984 NCAA FOOTBALL TELEVISION COMM. TO THE 79TH ANN. CONVENTION OF THE NCAA 20 (1985).
6. See Note, Educating Misguided Student Athletes: An Application of Contract Theory, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 96, 106 (1985).
7. See id. at 96. Most athletic scholarships include amounts for tuition, room, board, and
books. See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1460.
8. See Charitable Contributions, supra note 4, at 117.
9. I.R.C. S 117 (West 1985). For the text of this provision, see infra note 25.
10. Stuart, Tax Status of Scholarships and Fellowship Grants: Frustration of Legislative Purpose and
Approaches to Obtain the Exclusion Granted by Congress, 25 EMORY L.J. 357, 358 (1976); Note, The
Taxability of Scholarships and Fellowship Grants: A Student Guide, 1964 NOTRE DAME LAw. 301, 301;
Comment, Exclusion of Fellowship Grants from Gross Income, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 326, 326.
11. 20 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 488. 489 n.6 (1969). Under the 1939 Code, gifts were excluded
from income under I.R.C. S 22(b)(3) (1939). Id. See Stuart, supra note 10, at 358-59; Note, supra
note 10, at 301; 31 OHIo ST. L.J. 186, 191 (1970).
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Determining whether a grant was a gift necessitated a case-by-case approach 2
in which each grant was subjected to a "gift vs. compensation" test.' 3 Despite
the lack of a dear standard, scholarship grants were often considered gifts and
were thus tax free.' 4 Nonetheless, uncertainty and confusion pervaded the issue. 5
6
called for a more specific
Educational leaders, desiring certainty and simplicity,'
7
scholarships.'
of
provision covering the taxability
Congress balanced several policies when it enacted the provision. First, Congress expressed a desire to support higher education, 8 primarily through encouraging financial aid.1' Juxtaposed against this policy was a concern that the
label "scholarship" not be used to exclude amounts disguised as salary or
compensation. 20 By designing a specific tax provision to cover scholarships,2
Congress acknowledged the significant role of these grants in American society. '
indicates that Congress inCommentators have suggested that this background
22
tended the provision to be interpreted liberally.
III.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

The Internal Revenue Code begins with the premise that all income is
taxable.2 3 If a taxpayer wishes to claim an exclusion from income, he has the

12. Stuart, supra note 10, at 392; 31 OHO ST. L.J. 186, 191 (1970).
13. Comment, Taxability of Scholarships and Fellowships, 35 Mo. L. REv. 393, 396 (1970).
14. Comment, Federal Income Taxation - Scholarshipand Fellowship Grants - Validation of Treasuy
Regulation, 58 Ky. L.J. 589, 591 (1970).
15. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4041; Comment, supra note 13, at 393; Comment, supra note 10, at 326.
16. Savage, The Taxation of Scholarships and Fellowships. Continuing Controversy and Confusion, 15
TAx ADVIsER 41, 42 (1984); Stuart, supra note 10, at 359; Hutton, Scholarships and Fellowships: Wat's
in a Name?, 1970 A.B.A. J. 592, 592.
17. Comment, Scholarships, Fellowships, and the Tax Laws: A Critical Review, 17 U. KAN. L.
REV. 104, 104 (1968).
18. Tabac, Scholarships and Fellowship Grants: An Administrative Merry-Go-Round, 46 TAXES 485,
485 (1968) ("A well-educated citizenry is one of our most important national interests."); Comment,
supra note 17, at 104; Comment, supra note 10, at 329.
19. H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 15, at 37 app. See 20 CASE W. RES. 488, 489 & n.7,
492 (1969).
20. M. CHAMBERS, THE COLLEGES AND THE COURTS 78 (1972); 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
488, 491 n.14 (1969).
21. Note, supra note 10, at 309; Comment, supra note 17, at 106.
22. Clurman & Reiner, Scholarship and Fellowship Grants: An Analysis of Factors Needed for Exclusion, 39 J. TAx'N 150, 155 (1973) ("the enacted statutory provisions... were intended to be
liberal in nature").
23. I.R.C. S 61(a) (West 1985) reads as follows:
(a) GENERAL DEFINITION. - Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross
income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the
following items:
(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, and similar items;
(2) Gross income derived from business;
(3) Gains derived from dealings in property;
(4) Interest;
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burden to prove the income fits within a statutory exception. 24 The exemption
provision covering scholarships is section 117 .2 Section 117 was originally considered to be quite straight-forward, thereby clarifying this area of law.2 6 Section
117 excludes from gross income some scholarship grants, as well as stipends
received to cover disbursement for travel, research, clerical help, or equipment

(5) Rents;
(6) Royalties;

(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)

Dividends;
Alimony and separate maintenance payments;
Annuities;
Income from life insurance and endowment contracts;
Pensions;
Income from discharge of indebtedness;

(13) Distributive share of partnership gross income;
(14) Income in respect of a decedent;
(15) Income from an interest in an estate or trust.
See Gordon, IRS' Use of Gift-Compsation Test Delays Practical Fellowship Income Rule, 13 J. TAx'N
272, 274 (1960) ("The word 'income' has been extended to its Constitutional limits.... [T]here
is little reason, absent Congressional fiat, to exclude scholarships and fellowships."); Note, supra
note 10, at 301-02.
24. Sharvy v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 630, 634, aff'd, 566 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1977).
25. I.R.C. 5 117 (West 1985) reads:
(a) GENERAL RULE. In the case of an individual, gross income does not include
(1) any amount received (A) as a scholarship at an educational organization described in section
170(b)(1)(A)(ii), or
(B) as a fellowship grant, including the value of contributed services and
accommodations; and
(2) any amount received to cover expenses for (A) travel,
(B) research,
(C) clerical help, or
(D) equipment,
which are incident to such a scholarship or to a fellowship grant, but only to the extent that the
amount is so expended by the recipient.
(b) LIMITATIONS. (1) Individuals who are candidates for degrees. In the case of an
individual who is a candidate for a degree at an educational organization
described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii), subsection (a) shall not apply to that
portion of any amount received which represents payment for teaching, re-

search, or other services in the nature of part-time employment required as
a condition to rtceiving the scholarship or the fellowship grant. If teaching,
research, or other services are required of all candidates (whether or not
recipients of scholarships or fellowship grants) for a particular degree as a
condition to receiving such degree, such teaching, research, or other services
shall not be regarded as part-time employment within the meaning of this
paragraph.
26. Savage, supra note 16, at 42; Randall, Teaching Assistants and Taxes - Paid to Study, or
Paid to Work?, 8 GoNz. L. REv. 33, 33 (1972). Soon after § 117 was enacted, a commentator
praised it because it would "undoubtedly clirify this area of law." Loring, Some Tax Problems of
Students and Scholars, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 153, 159 (1957).
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incident to the grant.2 7 The remaining provisions of section 117 limit this seemingly broad exclusion. For degree candidates, scholarships fall within this ex28
clusion unless services are required as a condition to receiving the grant.
Because almost all athletes on scholarships must be degree candidates,2 this
30
provision will apply to most athletic scholarships.
By enacting section 117, Congress ostensibly intended it to be the sole test
of exclusion.3 1 Therefore, if a grant is characterized as a scholarship, section
117 governs its determination of exclusion even if the amount might logically
fall under other Code exclusion provisions dealing with prizes or gifts. 32 A
precise definition of the term "scholarship," however, is visibly absent from
both section 11733 and its legislative history.3 4 Congress apparently believed the
term was not susceptible to a wide range of interpretation. 35 Additionally, if
any dispute arose, the Treasury Department could promulgate a uniform definition in a Treasury Regulation. 36 Soon after enactment of the 1954 Code,
37
the Department proposed guidelines which it later adopted.
The Treasury Regulations cite three instances in which a grant will not be
considered a scholarship. 38 First, a payment which represents compensation for
27. I.R.C. S 117(a) (West 1985).
28. Id. S 117(bXl). Such a condition is disregarded if these services are required of all degree
candidates. Id.
29. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), to which most colleges and universities belong, requires that scholarships be awarded only to those athletes who are pursuing a
degree. NCAA Const. art. III, S 3(aX1). S D. YOUNG, THE LAW AND THE STUDENT SN HIGHER
EDUCATION 37 (1976).
30. Because most athletes on scholarship must be degree-seeking, scholarships for non-degree
candidates will not be explored in-depth in this paper. Briefly, these grants are not excluded unless
the grantor is a tax-exempt organization. Even if this requirement is met, however, the exclusion
is limited to $300 per month and will not be allowed beyond a total of 36 months. I.R.C. S
117(bX2) (West 1985).
31. Note, supra note 10, at 301; Comment, supra note 13, at 394; Comment, supra note 10,
at 326.
32. Comment, supra note 13, at 394.
33. Id. See Chommie, Servtces Rendered, Not Donative Intent, Governs Exemption of Study Grants, 4
J. TAx'N 375, 375 (1956); Note, supra note 10, at 303; Comment, supra note 10, at 327.
34. Randall, Athletic Scholarships and Taxes: Or a Touchdown in Taxes, 7 GoNZ. L. REV. 297,
298 (1972); Comment, supra note 13, at 394.
35. Myers, Supreme Court in Unenlightening Decision Holds "Scholarship" Taxable, 31 J. TAx'N
20, 20 (1969). Some commentators suggest the failure to define "scholarship" would not pose a
serious problem due to the limitations imposed by other provisions of S 117. See Chommie, supra
note 33, at 375.
36. Comment, supra note 14, at 593.
37. The regulations were proposed in September 1955 and were adopted in June 1956. Myers
& Hopkins, IRS is Limiting the Scope of the Exclusion for Fellowship and Scholarship Grants, 42 J. TAX'N
212, 213 (1975); Myers, Tax Status of Scholarships and Fellowships, 22 TAX LAw. 391, 396 (1969).
38. Treas. Reg. S 1.117-4(c) (West 1985) reads:
The following payments or allowances shall not be considered to be amounts received
as a scholarship or a fellowship grant for the purpose of section 117:
Amounts paid as compensation for services or primarily for the benefit of the
grantor.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (ay of 5 1-117-2, any amount paid
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past, present, or future employment services is not a scholarship.3 9 Second, an
amount which signifies remuneration for services subject to the direction or
supervision of the grantor is likewise not a scholarship.' Finally, a sum given
to enable an individual to pursue studies or research primarily for the grantor's
benefit does not fall within the sphere of the section 117 exclusion." To determine whether a grant falls within one of these categories, the Service focused
42
on the intent of the grantor rather than that of the recipient.
The term "scholarship" itself received a rather broad definition under the
regulations.4 3 A scholarship is an amount given to aid an individual in conducting his studies.4 4 This definition corresponds to the general meaning usually
attributed to the term. 5 Because the definition is so expansive, it has proved

or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to enable him to pursue studies
or research, if such amount represents compensation for past, present, or
future employment services or represents payment for services which are
subject to the direction or supervision of the grantor.
(2) Any amount paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to
enable him to pursue studies or research primarily for the benefit of the
grantor.
However, amounts paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to
enable him to pursue studies or research are considered to be amounts
received as a scholarship or fellowship grant for the purpose of the studies
or research is to further the education and training of the recipient in his
individual capacity and the amount provided by the grantor for such purpose
does not represent compensation or payment for the services described in
subparagraph (1) of this paragraph. Neither the fact that the recipient is
required to furnish reports of his progress to the grantor, nor the fact that
the results of his studies or research may be of some incidental benefits to
the grantor shall, of itself, be considered to destroy the essential character
of such amount as a scholarship or fellowship grant.
39.

Id. S 1.117-4(c)(1).

40.

Id.

41. Id. 5 1.117-4(c)(2). For a discussion of the regulations, see generally Clurman & Reiner,
supra note 22, at 151; Hutton, supra note 16, at 592; Phelan & Jones, Taxabiliy of Fellowship Grants
or Scholarships, 52 TAxEs 83, 91 (1974); Weiss, Taxability of Scholarships and Fellowship Grants, 1963
DuxE L.J. 488, 493-94; Comment, supra note 17, at 108; Comment, supra note 13, at 398.
42. Rev. Rul. 66-83, 1966-1 C.B. 30. See Comment, supra note 17, at 109.
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3(a) (West 1985) reads:

A scholarship generally means an amount paid or allowed to, or for the benefit of, a
student, whether an undergraduate or a graduate, to aid such individual in pursuing his
studies. The term includes the value of contributed services (see paragraph (d) of this
section) and the amount of tuition, matriculation, and other fees which are furnished or
remitted to a student to aid him in pursuing his studies. The term also includes any
amount received in the nature of a family allowance as a part of a scholarship. However,
the term does not include any amount provided by an individual to aid a relative, friend,
or other individual in pursuing his studies where the grantor is motivated by family or
philanthropic considerations. If an educational institution maintains or participates in a
plan whereby the tuition of a child of a faculty member of such institution is remitted by
any other participating educational institution attended by such child, the amount of the
tuition so remitted shall be considered to be an amount received as a scholarship.
44. Id. See Note, supra note 10, at 303-04; Comment, supra note 10, at 327.
45. See Gordon, supra note 23, at 273 ("definition... is in accord with general usage");
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to be of little value in resolving questions of excludability." Nevertheless, the
definition has provided a mechanism to prevent the use of the term "scholarship" by a grantor from being determinative. 47 Other than this, the problems
to obscure any clarity
caused by the promulgation of these regulations seem
4
the Treasury Department sought by issuing them.

8

Although the purpose of section 117 and its regulations was to provide
certainty to a questioned area of law, section 117 has become one of the more
widely challenged aspects of the 1954 Code. 49 Courts faced with these challenges
50
have demonstrated considerable perplexity when they applied these provisions.
Ironically, this confusion has led to greater uncertainty than existed before the
enactment of the scholarship exemption provision.51 Motivated by a desire to
exclude only those scholarships Congress wished to exclude, courts have developed various tests to make decisions on the scope of section 117. An analysis
of the taxation of athletic scholarships therefore requires an examination of these
differing levels of scrutiny.

IV. TEsTs
A.

OF ExcLUSION

Primaty Purpose Test

Because the regulations indicate that the relationship between grantor and
grantee will affect the determination of excludability, some courts have used a
"primary purpose" test. Under this analysis, the court inquires whether the
amount was given to benefit the grantor or grantee. 2 If the grant primarily
benefits the grantor, it is not an excludable scholarship. This test requires
scrutiny of the grantor's motives because these motives relate to the purpose
53
of the grant itself.
Although courts were split on the analysis to be used to determine excludability, the primary purpose test was the predominant test used until about
1970. 54 At this time, the test generally gave way to a quid pro quo analysis for

Gordon, Scholarship and Fellowship Grants as Income: A Search for Treasury Policy, 1960 WASH U.L.Q.
144, 149 (same); Comment, supra note 14, at 593 ("the definitions conform to their ordinary

meanings").
46. Comment, supra note 13, at 395.
47. Id. at 396.
48. Loring, supra note 26, at 160, 165; Weiss, supra note 41, at 498 (stating that a sizable
number of the challenges under S 117 derive from the Treasury Regulations).
49. &e Stuart, supra note 10, at 357.
50. Savage, supra note 16, at 42.
51. J. FREELAND, S. LIND & R. STEPHENS, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATiON 142
(4th ed. 1982) ("law... is in a somewhat chaotic state") [hereinafter cited as J. FREELAND]; Stuart,
supra note 10, at 357 ("litigation.. .has resulted in greater confusion rather than a dearer definition
of the extent and scope of the exclusion"); Comment, supra note 10, at 327 ("the issue... has
caused much uncertainty"); 20 CASE W. RES. L.REv. 488, 488 (1969) ("treatment.. .has perplexed
the courts").
52. 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 186, 191 (1970).
53. Id. See Tipgos, The Taxability of Scholarships and Fellowships: Revisited, 57 TAXEs 538, 541
(1979).
54. Weiss, supra note 41, at 503; Note, The Taxability of Educational Grants, 31 WASH. & LEE
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ascertaining the scope of section 117. 5- Even after 1970 some courts have continued to look in a few instances at the primary purpose standard as an adjunct
test.56
Problems which developed from the use of the primary purpose test explain
the growing dissatisfaction which surrounds it. When a court looks to the gran57
it patently ignores the
tor's motive to determine the propriety of exclusion,
58
fact that a grantor's motive in making a grant is seldom totally altruistic.
Furthermore, calling for a factual appraisal of whose interest is primary en59
courages parties and courts to easily manipulate facts to reach a desired result.
This derives in part from the nature of the grant itself. Most frequently, both
grantor and grantee will secure mutual benefit from the payment.' Additionally,
6
the use of the primary purpose test leads to an inquiry that is very fact specific, '
giving rise to a case-by-case approach that Congress originally wanted to avoid
by enacting section 117 .62
B.

The Quid Pro Quo Test

The provision of the Treasury Regulations providing that payments which
6
represent compensation for services are not tax free 1 gave rise to a quid pro
6
quo analysis. 4 In general, the quid pro quo test involves an appraisal of whether
the grant results from a bargained-for relationship rather than the endowment
of a no-strings attached grant. 65 The United States Supreme Court in Bingler
v. Johnson, the only Supreme Court dcision dealing with section 117, upheld

L. REv. 455, 463 (1974); Comment, supra note 13, at 400. After 1970, the chief test became the
quid pro quo analysis, discussed infra text accompanying notes 63-86. The impetus for the predominance of this test was the 1969 United States Supreme Court decision of Bingler v. Johnson, 394
U.S. 741 (1969), discussed infra text accompanying notes 66-75.
55. Clurman & Reiner, supra note 22, at 153; Savage, supra note 16, at 45; Stuart, supra
note 10, at 379. See Myers, supra note 34, at 22 (predicting an uncertain future for the primary
purpose test).
56. Clurman & Reiner, supra note 22, at 153. See Mylan, Current Tax Treatment of Education
Costs, 32 U. FLA. L. Rav. 387, 414 (1980) (alluding to the continued vitality of the primary purpose
test).
57. See supra note 53 and accompanying text; Comment, supra note 10, at 328; Comment,
supra note 13, at 401; 31 OHIo ST. L.J. 186, 191-92 (1970).
58. Comment, supra note 13, at 401.
59. Stuart, supra note 10, at 367. See Comment, supra note 13, at 401 ("this approach may
in practice prove too much, for the student will always say that it is primarily for his educational
benefit, and then marshal facts to support his view").
60. Stuart, supra note 10, at :367; Comment, supra note 10, at 328; Comment, supra note 13,
at 401; Comment, supra note 14, at 594-95.
61. See Tipgos, supra note 53, at 540; Comment supra note 13, at 401.
62. See Comment, supra note 13, at 395 (regulations have encouraged a return to the pre1954 position).
63. Treas. Reg. 5 1.117-4(c)(1) (West 1985).
64. Stuart, supra note 10, at 370, 376.
65. Clurman & Reiner, supra note 22, at 151; Sanders, Tax Aspects of Scholarships, PRAc. LAW.,
Oct. 15, 1984, at 82; Note, supra note 54, at 464; 31 OHIo ST. L.J. 186, 192 (1970).
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the use of this test,66 and further held that the limitation provisions of the
Treasury Regulations were definitional in nature. 67
In Bingler, the taxpayer challenged the validity of the regulations, claiming
they were inconsistent with the statute.68 The Third Circuit agreed with the
taxpayer and held the regulations invalid because they apparently limited the
broad provisions of section 117.69 Reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court stated that the Treasury Department legitimately
promulgated the regulations to, further the congressional intent that compensation not avoid taxation under the guise of a claim of scholarship. 7" The Court
further observed that Congress empowered the Commissioner, and not the courts,
to establish regulations implementing the Internal Revenue Code. 7' The Court
did not believe the supplemental restrictions, which deny exclusion to grants
representing compensation, were "plainly inconsistent" with congressional intent.7 2 Accordingly the Supreme Court upheld the quid pro quo test, 73 and since
Bingler, the primary question has been whether the grantor gave the payment
to the taxpayer in return for services. 7" The Court did not eliminate the primary
purpose test, but suggested it should be used only after the quid pro quo hurdle
has been overcome.

75

The Bingler decision has led courts and commentators to agree that, although

the quid pro quo test may not be completely dispositive, 76 it is presently the test

77
to use to determine whether a scholarship will be excluded from gross income.

66. 394 U.S. 741 (1969). See 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 186, 192.
67. 394 U.S. at 749. See also Mylan, supra note 56, at 413; Phelan & Jones, supra note 41,
at 86; 7 SAN DiNco L. REv. 154, 159 (1970).
68. 394 U.S. at 744-46. See O'Neil, Supreme Court Upholds Internal Revenue Service in Section 117
Dispute, 43 FLA. B.J. 448, 448 (1969).
69. 394 U.S. at 747. See 31 OHIo ST. L.J. 186, 189-90 (1970).
70. 394 U.S. at 749. See also Stuart, supra note 10, at 377-79; Comment, supra note 13, at
397.
71. 394 U.S. at 750-51, 753. See also 31 OHIo ST. L.J. 186, 190 (1970).
72. 394 U.S. at 752. See also Comment, supra note 13, at 397.
73. See 31 OHIo ST. L.J. 186, 188-91 (1970).
74. Stuart, supra note 10, at 376.
75. 394 U.S. at 758 n.32. See Comment, supra note 14, at 597 (.'primary purpose' test is
not relevant if the grant represents payment"); Myers, supra note 35, at 22 (same); 31 OHIO ST.
LJ. 186, 192 (1970) (primary purpose test is "merely an adjunct to the initial 'compensation'
provision"). Before the Bingler decision, other courts had already determined the definitional constraint of the regulations must first be satisfied before a primary purpose test of exclusion could
be used. See, e.g., Reese, 45 T.C. 407, 413, aff'd, 317 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1967). See also Myers,
supra note 35, at 21; Tipgos, supra note 53, at 540. But see Myers & Hopkins, supra note 37, at
212-13 (suggesting that scrutiny for any element of service to determine excludability results from
an improper reading of Bingler).
76. See Raabe & Willis, Requirementsfor Exclusion of Fellowship.Grants, 55 TAXES 190, 193 (1977);
Stuart, supra note 10, at 357; Tipgos, supra note 53, at 540. See also Clurman & Reiner, supra-note
22, at 153 ("Although some courts still adhere to the 'primary purpose' doctrine, few cases will
qualify for tax exclusion under section 117.").
77. Steinmetz v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 384 (N.D. Cal. 1972); J. FREELAND, supra note51, at 146; Clurman & Reiner, supra Aote 22, at 153; Stuart, supra note 10, at 376; Note, supra
note 54, at 465; Comment, supra note 14, at 598 n.38. For an extensive listing of courts' use of
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Therefore, the appropriateness of taxing an athletic scholarship will most likely
be scrutinized under a quid pro quo analysis; only those grants which lack a
quid pro quo will be tax free. 7"
Use of the test since 1970 has revealed that a quid pro quo will generally be
easily found. 79 In the comparatively rare instances in which the taxpayer has
won, the determinative factor was that the "quid" given for the scholarship
inured to the benefit of the educational community at large rather than the
recipient himself.8s Other courts, referring to the exact language the Supreme
Court used, require a "substantial" quid pro quo.8 ' Nonetheless, the quid pro quo
inquiry has provided much more unfavorable treatment for taxpayers than has
the primary purpose test.
Like the primary purpose test, however, the quid .pro quo test has met its
share of criticism. Besides claims the Bingler decision has been misread,8 2 the
quid pro quo standard has been criticized as reviving the pre-1954 "gift vs.
compensation" test, 83 and also as being too restrictive. 84 These characteristics
seemingly circumvent congressional intent. 85 Notwithstanding these assertions,
the quid pro quo examination remains the test used in almost every determination
6
of scholarship taxation.
V.

CURRENT

LAW ON TAXATION

OF ATHLETIC

SCHOLARSHIPS

In the thirty years since the enactment of section 117, no court has been

the quid pro quo test, see generally Note, supra note 54, at 470-73 & nn. 68-72.
The Service recently reaffirmed its adherence to the Bingler test. Private Letter Ruling 8536052
(June 11, 1985) (student body president's scholarship not excludible from gross income because he
was required to perform services in return for the grant). See Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1985, at 1,
col. 5 (discussing Private Letter Ruling 8536052).
78. See Stuart, supra note 10, at 379 n.157.
79. Note, supra note 54, at 472-73 ("[T]he vast majority of cases have produced results
unfavorable to the taxpayer."). See Savage, supra note 16, at 46-47; Stuart, supra note 10, at 380;
Tipgos, supra note 53, at 544.
80. See Savage, supra note 16, at 45.
81. 394 U.S. at 751. See, e.g., Hembree v. United States, 464 F.2d 1262 (4th Cir. 1972).
See Myers & Hopkins, supra note 37, at 213. For a brief discussion of Hembree, see Randall, supra
note 26, at 36 n.24. In the Bingler decision, the Supreme Court later referred to the requirement
of a quid pro quo without using the modifier "substantial." 394 U.S. at 757. See Tipgos, supra note
53, at 543. Because of this, most courts have ignored the term "substantial," as has the Internal
Revenue Service. See Savage, supra note 16, at 45. This has led one commentator to conclude that
in decisions following Bingler, "the relevant inquiry [is] whether any 'quid pro quo' was involved,
rather than whether a 'quid pro quo' was 'substantial.' " Id.
82. See Raabe & Willis, supra note 76, at 193; supra note 81 and accompanying text.
83. SeeJ. FREELAND, supra note 51, at 145; Mylan, supra note 56, at 423; Stuart, supra note
10, at 376. But see Note, supra note 54, at 465-66 (distinguishing the two tests by asserting that
"the quid pro quo test, unlike the gift vs. compensation test, permits an incidental return to the
grantor"). For a discussion of the pre-1954 treatment of scholarships, see supra text accompanying

notes 10-14.
84. Stuart, supra note 10, at 385. See Clurman & Reiner, supra note 22, at 153 ("the door
to exclusion under section 117 is all but closed"); Savage, supra note 16, at 44; Note, supra note
54, at 472-73.
85. See Myers, supra note 37, at 409.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
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specifically faced with determining whether an athletic scholarship is a taxable
grant.87 However, the Tax Court has peripherally dealt with the issue on at
least three occasions. In Heidel v. Commissioner, the taxpayer wanted to include
his athletic scholarship as "support" for purposes of income averaging." Heidel
had received an athletic scholarship from Ole Miss in 1961 . 9 The court refused
to let him include the scholarship in income averaging, holding that the scholarship may not be counted as "support furnished by" the taxpayer within the
income averaging provision."
In a later decision, Frost v. Commissioner, the court faced a similar situation. 9'
In this case, the taxpayer had received a baseball scholarship from the University
of California in 1963. 92 Facing the same issue, the court applied the Heidel
holding.93
The issue presented to the courts in Heidel and Frost indicates that these
decisions cannot readily be applied to the apprisement of the taxability of athletic
scholarships. Neither court directly ruled on the taxation of the scholarships
under section 117. 94 In neither case did the Internal Revenue Service challenge
the taxability of these scholarships, 95 most likely because the statute of limitations
for taxingthese amounts had run. 9' Furthermore, the Service later issued a
ruling which stated that the Heidel decision applied to all scholarships, not just
to athletic scholarships. 97 A subsequent revenue ruling, however, indicates that
Heidel is not dispositive of the issue of an athletic scholarship's taxability. 9 Even
on its issue, Heidel and its progeny" have not escaped criticism.1° '
The most recent decision referring to the taxation of athletic scholarships is
Jolitz v. Commissioner."0' In this case, the taxpayer had received athletic scholarships from the University of Cincinnati from 1971-74.102 However, probably
also because the statute of limitations had run, the Service stipulated to the
tax-free status of the grants. 0 3 The scant case law dealing tangentially with the

87. See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1461 (the Tax Court has only considered "the tax status of
these grants... rather obliquely").
88. 56 T.O. 95 (1971).
89. Id. at 97.
90. Id. at 104.
91. 61 T.C. 488 (1974).
92. Id. at 489.
93. Id. at 493-94.
94. See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1461 & n.183. See also Randall, supra note 34, at 303 &
n.29.
95. See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1461.
96. Se id. at 1461 n.186.
97. Rev. Rul. 75-40, 1975-1 C.B. 276. See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1461.
98. Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47. For a discussion of this ruling, see infra notes 10407 and accompanying text.
99. Besides Frost, another case which recognizes the limited holding of Heidel is Sharvy v.
Commissioner, 67 T.C. 630, 638, 640-42, aff'd, 566 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1977).
100. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 34, at 300 ("It is respectfully submitted that [the Heidel
decision] was wrong.").
101. 73 T.C. 732 (1980).
102. Id. at 733.
103. Id.
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taxation of athletic scholarships therefore gives no genuine insight into section
117 treatment of these scholarships.
Although no cases address the section 117 exclusion issue, the Internal Revenue Service in 1977 issued a revenue ruling dealing with the taxation of athletic
scholarships.10 4 The Service was asked for its opinion on the taxability of an
athletic scholarship having three characteristics. First, the issuing institution
expected, but did not require, the student to participate in athletics. Second,
the university did not cancel the scholarship if the student decided not to participate. Finally, the university required no particular activity in lieu of participation if the student decided not to engage in intercollegiate athletics.'
In reaching its decision, the Service expectedly employed the quid pro quo
analysis of Bingler v. Johnson 106 Upon considering the three characteristics of
this particluar scholarship, the Service opined that the grant would not be
includable in gross income.10 7 Inferentially, when considering that the university
would have continued the scholarship regardless of whether the student participated in athletics, the Service did not find the requisite quid pro quo. This ruling
might not prove to be beneficial because most athletic scholarships do not have
these three characteristics. The NCAA permits its member organizations" s to
issue scholarships with far fewer restrictions than these. 1° 9 Some uncertainty
surrounds the question of what result would have occurred had only one of
the features been present. One commentator has suggested this ruling created
a presumption that an athletic scholarship is taxable whenever the student is
required, rather than merely expected, to take part in the school's athletic
program." 0 However, the cursory nature of the materials dealing with athletic
scholarships indicates a more plenary analysis is needed.
VI.
A.

ANALYSES

UNDER

THE VARIOUS

TESTS

Athletic Scholarships Under the Primay Purpose Test

The primary purpose test focuses on the grantor's motive and looks to the
party who primarily benefits from the grant. Under this analysis, if the athlete
rather than the granting institution derives primary benefit from the grant, the
scholarship will be exempt from taxation."' Undeniably, an athletic scholarship
does benefit an athlete. The scholarship enables the student to obtain an ed-

104.
105.

Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47.
Id. Rarely will a university issue an athletic scholarship under these circumstances. For

a discussion of the general characteristics of athletic scholarships, see infra notes 124-52 and accompanying text.
106. Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. at 48. For a discussion of the Bingler decision, see supra
notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
107. Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. at 48.
108. The status of NCAA membership is discussed supra note 29.
109. See NCAA Const. art. III, § 4(c).
110. Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1462.
111. For a discussion and critique of the primary purpose test, see supra text accompanying
notes 52-62.
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ucation which he might not otherwise obtain. 2 However, the rate of graduation
for recruited athletes belies this; the current average rate of graduation for
football recruits is only 48.6 percent."'
The university also benefits from the performance of the student-athlete who
has received a scholarship. The performance of the athlete is measured in large
part by the amount of gate receipts and contributions the athlete brings into
the university."' One commentator has surmised that the purpose of an intercollegiate athletic program is to appease alumni, who in turn provide needed
contributions to the institution." 5
Other than direct contributions, other benefits also accrue to the university.
For instance, Boston College, an institution of about 10,000 students, has derived considerable benefit from the performance of its Heisman athlete Doug
Flutie. Not only have applications for admission increased, but the campus
bookstore has also reported selling almost a half-million dollars worth of Flutie
items this past football season." 6 Although Flutie's role as a stellar athlete
explains some of the considerable benefit to the college, most athletes given
scholarships are chosen because of their ability to enhance the school's athletic
program. In a recent year, the average profit earned by each football program
7
of the larger universities was $797,000."
No clear indication of the tax status of an athletic grant exists under the
primary purpose test.' Given the increased profit-oriented nature of intercollegiate athletics," 9 the determination tends to lean in favor of taxing the scholarship. However, because a contemporary section 117 analysis rarely employs
primary purpose scrutiny, 20 examination under the quid pro quo test is also
necessary.

112. The NCAA asserts that one of its purposes is "to promote and develop educational
leadership." NCAA Const. art II, S 1(a). The following scenario is representative of the situation
of many student athletes:
Glenn Mogle needed the scholarship. A 6-foot-8, 280 pound offensive lineman coming
out of Sarasota Riverview High School in 1983, Mogle was a consensus prep All-America
and All-South the last two years of high school.
Mogle, whose father is disabled, went to the University of Michigan, financially poor,
but athletically rich.
Farry, Risky Business, Independent Fla. Alligator, Mar. 29, 1985, at 11, col. 1.
113. 22-Skiddoo, supra note 2, at 7 (based on the 1978-79 class of recruits in the 63-member
College Football Association).
114. See Crowl, NCAA Can Prevent Abuses Many College Chiefs Say, CHRON oF HIGHER EDUC.,
Jan. 5, 1983, at 21, cols. 1-2.
115. Randall, supra note 34, at 307.
116. 22-Skiddoo, supra note 2, at 10.
117. See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1441. The current average profits is probably greater than
this, as this amount is a 1977 figure. Interestingly, some states have statutory provisions providing
that amounts given as athletic scholarships at state-supported institutions must be limited to only
those funds derived from athletic events. See, e.g., Randall, sepra note 34, at 307 (discussing the
law of the state of Washington).
118. See Randall, supra note 34, at 307 ("it is certainly not clear who is primarily benefiting
from the athletic program") (emphasis in original).
119. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56, 76-78.
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Athletic Scholarships under the Quid Pro Quo Test

The tax status of an athletic scholarship will most likely hinge upon the
quid pro quo analysis. 2 1 Past use of this test indicates the test narrowly construes
the scholarship exemption provision,' 22 and further indicates a wide range of
criteria will be looked to to determine if a quid pro quo exists. To better present
a clear analysis under quid pro quo examination, several of these characteristics
23
must be explored as they relate to athletic scholarships.'
1.

General Characteristics

First, courts have looked to the economic benefit conferred. '24 If the grantor
derives a favorable financial result in return for the grant, then the scholarship
tends to be taxable.125 As established earlier, intercollegiate athletic programs
are generally very profitable. 26 Just as this factor supports athletic scholarships
not being within the scope of section 117 under the primary purpose test, it
also supports a finding of taxability under a quid pro quo inquiry.
A related characteristic is the existence of benefits other than those which
are directly economic in nature. In other areas, such as scholarships of medical
interns or graduate fellows, courts have found that the availability of scholarships
confers a benefit on the university because the university can reasonably anticipate successful recruiting due to the program.12 Thus, a quid pro quo relationship is present. Arguably then, the increased prestige' 2 of an institution
because of its athletic program, whether it be in increased applications for
enrollment 29 or better success in recruiting, similarly evinces the quid pro quo
association. 13

121. See supra notes 54-56, 76-713.
122. See supra note 84; infra noteii 171-73 and accompanying text. Such a construction comports
with the general proposition that all exemptions from income under the Internal Revenue Code
are construed narrowly. See Note, supra note 54, at 457.
123. The Bingler decision did not change the earlier need to examine the facts and circumstances
of each grant to determine its tax status. See Myers, supra note 35, at 20.
124. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 14, at 598 (discussing the effect of the Bingler decision).
125. See id.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4, 114-17. See also Note, supra note 6, at 119 ("Participation in the university's athletic program confers a benefit on the university."). But see Klein,
Bad Marks for College Athletes, Wall St. J., Mar. 29, 1985, at 26, col. 3 ("Most varsity college

programs barely support themselves.").
127. See Note, supra note 54, at 469 (discussing Ide v. United States, 32 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)
5366 (W.D. Mich. June 12, 1973), aff'd sub. noma., Commissioner v. Ide, 335 F.2d 852 (3d Cir.
1964)).
128. An athletic program can affect the prestige of an institution just as having a renowned
professor does. "In practice... student athletes perform services for the university in much the

same way as a famed faculty member, and arouse interest in a way comparable to a rare curriculum
offering. They influence potential students, induce media attention, and attract sources of revenue."
Note, supra note 6, at 105.
129. &e supra text accompanying note 116.
130. The benefit to the institution is further exhibited by the paperwork surrounding the

awarding of an athletic scholarship. These materials generally include a financial aid statement,
the letter of intent, the university bulletin, the general catalog, as well as other pamphlets and
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The mode of selection for awarding athletic scholarships also sheds some
light on the quid pro quo analysis. When a university awards a scholarship on
the basis of financial need rather than athletic ability, one can argue the scholarship should be tax free because the student's potential for helping the university derive a benefit is not determinative." However, most athletic scholarships
are offered to recruit athletes, not students; therefore, institutions for the large
32
part base their decisions on merit, not financial need.'
Another factor which influences a determination of taxability is the level of
control or supervision a granting institution retains over the recipient once the
institution grants the scholarship. Generally, the more control the grantor has
33
over the grantee, the more likely the grant will be a taxable quid pro quo.
Quite often, restrictions imposed on athletes, both by the NCAA and the institution itself, are far greater than those imposed on the general student body.' 34
Furthermore, in searching for a quid pro quo, at least one court has compared
the amount of time the student participated in activities related to the scholarship
to the amount of time spent in regular classroom activities.' 3 5 In the larger
universities, most football players spend about half of their sixteen-hour day on
activities relating to the athletic program.' 3 6 Although in other sports the corresponding amount of time is not quite as significant, the athlete's schedule
does indicate the university does retain a great deal of control over him.
One characteristic the Internal Revenue Service mentioned when issuing its
only ruling on athletic scholarships was the requirement that the recipient perform activities other than mere participation in a sport. 's3 In part because the
student was not required to engage in any other activities, the Service determined that the scholarship had cleared the quid pro quo hurdle to warrant section
117 exclusion.' 3 However, most institutions grant athletic scholar-stfis with the
general understanding the student will perform other functions for the school
or its athletic department if the student can no longer participate in the athletic

brochures. A perusal indicates these materials are generally framed to guard the university's interests. See Note, supra note 6, at 114-16.
131. See Stuart, supra note 10, at 386 ("When.. .a grantee was selected on the basis of his
need for financial assistance rather than merit, it certainly strengthens the case for the taxpayer.").
132. See Randall, supra note 34, at 303 ("[A]thletic scholarships... generally are not based
upon need, are not part of the educational process and are surely not used to attract students
rather than athletes.").
133. See Chommie, supra note 33, at 376; Hutton, supra note 16, at 593; Stuart, supra note
10, at 388.
134. See Note, supra note 6, at 115 n.114.
135. A.E. Rosenthal, 63 T.C. 454 (1975). The students spent 75 percent of their time in
activities relating to the scholarship and 25 percent of their time in "formal classroom activities."

The court found the requisite quid pro quo. Id. at 458. For a discussion of the Rosenthal case, see
Stuart, supra note 10, at 380-82.
136. See Note, supra note 6, at 115 n.114.
137. Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47. For a discussion of this ruling, see supra text accompanying notes 104-10,
138. However, this was only one of three factors the Service considered in reaching its decision.
See supra text accompanying notes 105, 107-09.
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activity. 13 9 Some schools also make this requirement part of the express agreement between the student and the athletic department.140 For instance, at the
University of Florida, women athletes are required to sign a provision that they
will "[a]ccept responsibility within the women's athletic program if unable to
compete due to injury or illness."'' The presence of this obligation more clearly
suggests the existence of a quid pro quo. 42
Another factor the Service discussed in its ruling is whether a student is
merely expected rather than required to participate in athletics.14 3 Although the
Service decided that the scholarship in question was not taxable, several sources
suggest that this factor alone will not vitiate the presence of a quid pro quo. In
the Supreme Court's Bingler decision, one of the recipients was not required
to sign an agreement promising he would return to the grantor's service upon
completing his education; he understood, however, that he was expected to
return. His scholarship was held to be taxable income.' Subsequent to this
decision, similar scholarships have been held not to be section 117 tax-free
scholarships whenever only a clear expectation, rather than a contractual obligation,' 4 ' existed that the recipient would return a quid pro quo.'46 Consequently,
the widely-held expectation that an athlete on scholarship will participate in
athletics further corroborates presence of the requisite quid pro quo.
The last factor involved in Revenue Ruling 77-263 was that the university
would not cancel the scholarship if the student decided not to participate in
athletics. Because no possibility existed the scholarship would be cancelled, the
Service used this additional factor to find that no taxable grant existed.'4 7 As
with the other two factors, however, this characteristic is generally not found
among granting institutions.48 In recent years, for example, both Wake Forest
University'49 and the University of Kansas5 M have been permitted to cancel

139.

See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.

140. Statement by Marilyn Weiss, Assistant Athletic Director - Women's Sports, University
of Florida, in Gainesville, Florida (Feb. 19, 1985).
141. This work may or may not be administrative in nature. Id.
142. See supra text accompanying note 110.
143. Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. at 48.
144. Bingler, 394 U.S. at 744 n.7. See 7 SAN Diaoo L. REv. 154, 154 n.2 (1970) (discussing
this aspect of the case).
145. A student athlete's potential contractual obligations are discussed infra notes 153-67 and
accompanying text.

146.

E.g., MacDonald, 52 T.C. 386 (1969). See Mylan, supra note 56, at 414 n.139 (discussing

this factor).

147. Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. at 48.
148. "Although neither document specifically requires the athlete continue his participation in
athletic events... to obtain renewal of the award. .... it is doubtful that an athlete who drops out
of athletics is going to be strongly recommended for further aid when the initial grant runs out."
Randall, supra note 34, at 306.
149. See Taylor v. Wake Forest University, 16 N.C. App. 117, 191 S.E.2d 379, cert. denied,
282 N.C. 307, 192 S.E.2d 197 (1977). In Taylor, the court permitted a university to terminate an
athletic scholarship when the student, claiming interference with "reasonable academic progress,"
refused to take part in the football program. Id. For a discussion of this case, see Note, supra note
6, at 102-03. The issue in Taylor dealing with the existence of a contract is discussed infra notes
161-62 and accompanying text.
150.

Letter to the editor from Scott S. Britan, Attorney-at-Law, Miami Herald, Mar. 15,
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5
scholarships when the student athletes did not meet participation expectations. '
The possibility of cancellation further illuminates the quid pro quo nature of the
athletic scholarship; if the quo of participation is not met, the quid of financial
assistance will not be given.' 2

2.

Contractual Nature of Scholarship

Also relevant to a quid pro quo inquiry is the nature of negotiations leading
up to the awarding of the scholarship. If a grant is the consequence of a
bargained-for association, then the grant will not withstand section 117 scrutiny.'5 3 Elaborate methods of recruiting, in which coaches visit high schools
while prospective athletes visit university campuses,'5 4 evince indicia of negotiation. Coaches strive to convince the athlete that he should attend this rather
than a rival institution, while at the same time the student tries to demonstrate
that he is worthy to play for the university. The bargained-for nature of the
scholarship is further demonstrated by the national letter of intent program,
through which a student certifies by a specified date that he intends to attend
a specific university.15 5 At this point, "negotiations" have ended, with the student athlete deciding where to play.
A final factor in the determination of a quid pro quo is the presence of a
contractual obligation. Because the finding of consideration to support the existence of a contract parallels to some extent the finding of a quid pro quo to
support the taxation of a scholarship, an ascertainment of contract may support
the existence of a quid pro quo. The legal relationship between a student and
a university is basically contractual in nature.' 5 6 Moreover, the particular characteristics of the association between the student athlete and the university intimate the likelihood of the existence of a contract between the parties which

1985, at 22A ("[W]hen [the student] did not live up to the expectations they had for him on the
football field, the [University of Kansas] simply took away his scholarship.").

151. Coaches have recently made proposals that athletic scholarships not be subject to cancellation. For instance, Dean Smith, basketball coach at the University of North Carolina, "would
guarantee an athlete financial aid.. .regardless of whether he or she makes the team or is injured
and cannot play." Farrell, Witnesses at Hearing Clash Over Regulation of Academic Standardsfor College
OF HIGHER EDuc., July 5, 1984, at 28, col. 3. See also Randall, supra note 34, at

Athletes, CHRON.

309 (describing as "startling"

a proposal that "under no circumstances may a student be deprived

of financial aid, once the award has been confirmed in writing, because of failure to participate
in intercollegiate athletics").
152.

Accord Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1462 ("a clear quid pro quo is established, whereby an

athlete loses his scholarship if he withdraws for reasons other than physical injury"); Randall, supra
note 34, at 306 ("This would be seemingly close enough to the Bingler rationale to meet the quid
pro quo test.").

153.
Sr. L.J.
154.
(1984-85)

See Note, supra note 54, at 464 (such a rule arises from the Bingler decision); 31 OHIO
186, 192 (1970).
See NCAA Const. art. III, 5 5 (principles governing recruiting); NCAA Bylaws art. I
(recruiting).

155. For a discussion of the National Letter of Intent Program, see generally Note, supra note
6, at 114-15 (purpose is to deter "school-jumping"); Randall, supra note 34, at 306 (describing
different letters of intent used among the various athletic conferences).

156.

D.

YOUNG,

supra note 29, at 47.
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relates to the awarding of the athletic scholarship.' 57 Several factors suggest that
if a student-university contract is recognized, an athlete-university contract should
be more easily demonstrable.
The terms by which a student-athlete attends college are different from those
of the nonathlete student."' First, the general student body is under no specific
written obligation to uphold the university's regulations. Conversely, studentathletes do have such a written obligation under terms specified in both the
financial aid statement and the national letter of intent. These documents prescribe regulations exceeding those generally understood between the nonathlete
student and the institution.1 59 Another distinction between the student-athlete
and the general student body is that the athlete must generally perform services
for the university in exchange for the scholarship.' 6° The additional responsibilities of an athlete on scholarship support a finding of both consideration and
quid pro quo.

Although the contractual nature of the relationship has not been challenged
often,' 6' at least two courts have found such a contract to exist. In Taylor v.
Wake Fore'st University, the university ended an athlete's scholarship when he
refused to take part in practice for the football program.' 62 Because of the
contractual nature of the obligation between the parties, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals concluded the student was obliged to participate in the pro63
gram in exchange for the scholarship.
In an opposite situation, a Tennessee federal district court in Begley v. Corporation of Mercer University similarly used contract law to determine the rights
of the parties. 6 ' In this case, the university sought to repudiate the agreement
for an athletic scholarship when it discovered the student did not have the
requisite high school grade point average.' 65 The court found that because the
student could not meet one of the conditions of the contract, he could not
expect the university to perform its part of the contract by allowing him to
keep the athletic scholarship.' 66 Although these decisions do not challenge the

157. See Note, supra note 6, at 104.
158. See id. at 123.
159. See id. at 104. For a discussion of the various documents comprising the student athlete's
contractual obligation, see generally id. at 114-16.
160. See id. at 104-05. See also supra text accompanying notes 137-52 (explaining that a student
generally must perform some type of service to retain the athletic scholarship).
161. An athlete generally will not challenge his performance requirements while on scholarship
because of the possibility he might not be able to participate in intercollegiate athletics. For instance,
few student athletes are willing to challenge the enforceability of the letter of intent because "severe
penalties in terms of athletic eligibility follow from breach of the pledge." Note, supra note 6, at
104 n.44.
162. 16 N.C. App. 117, 191 S.E.2d 379, cert. .denied, 282 N.C. 307, 192 S.E.2d 197 (1972).
163. Id. at 121, 191 S.E.2d at 382. See Note, supra note 6, at 102-03 for a discussion of the
Taylor case. See also supra text accompanying notes 149-52.
164. 367 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
165. Id. at 909.
166. Id. at 910. The court invoked the general contract principle than when "one party is
unable to perform his part of the contract, he cannot be entitled to the performance of the contract
by the other party." Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol37/iss3/4

18

Lee: The
TaxationOF
ofATHLETIC
Athletic Scholarships:
An Uneasy Tension between
TAXATION
SCHOLARSHIPS

1985]

taxability of the grants, they do indicate the student must fulfill his obligations
in return for the scholarship. Such is the nature of the Bingler quid pro quo
requirement. 167
Looking at all the circumstances surrounding the athletic scholarship indicates the relationship is clearly one of quid pro quo. Because the Service and a
majority of courts currently use the quid pro quo test, most athletic scholarships
fail to pass section 117 scrutiny. Therefore, these grants should be treated as
6
taxable income if practice is to be consistent with the law. 1
VII.
A.

THE PROBLEM AND A SOLUTION

The Position of the Internal Revenue Service

The Service has not yet actively sought to tax athletic scholarships. 69 However, several circumstances suggest this area may be ripe for challenge by the
Service. Initially, the general climate of section 117 exclusion demonstrates that
fewer scholarships meet the requisite criteria.' 70 This is due in large part to the
use of the quid pro quo test, which is by far the most restrictive test used in
the history of section 117.'7' One commentator has concluded that the "door
to exclusion... is all but closed.' ' 72 Furthermore, those who have analyzed the
issue widely agree that athletic scholarships are the product of a taxable quid
pro quo.1

73

An additional factor encouraging a move to tax athletic scholarships is the

167. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74. Further authority in support of finding a contractual relationship are workers' compensation cases in which some courts have held that an athlete
on scholarship is an employee. See Van Horn v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 219 Cal. App. 2d
457, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1963); University of Denver v. Nemeth, 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423
(1953); Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1462 n.196 ("In workers' compensation cases, courts have had
little difficulty finding that athletic scholarships are- really contracts for employment"); Randall,
supra note 34, at 305 (such cases "strongly suggest that the quid pro quo... is present in the typical
athletic scholarship situation"); Note, supra note 6, at 111-12 n.97. Contra Rensing v. Indiana St.
Univ. Bd. of Trustees, Ind. App., 437 N.E.2d 78 (1982), rev'd, -Ind.-, 444 N.E.2d 1170 (1983)
(injured football player not employee entitled to workers' compensation).
Another argument supporting the classification of scholarships as contracts for employment evolves
from the area of labor relations. Because of the uncertainty surrounding tax status of scholarships,
several recipients at medical schools recently petitioned the National Labor Relations Board to
classify them as employees for purposes of collective bargaining. The Board rejected the students'
petition, asserting "the payments are more in the nature of a living allowance than compensation."
Se Tipgos, supra note 53, at 542, 545. Nonetheless, such a move indicates the growing perception
that the scholarship represents a contract in which the student does owe some obligation to the
granting institution.
168. See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1462; Randall, supra note 26, at 38; Randall, supra note 34,
at 309.
169. Upon enactment of the Code, but before the adoption of the pertinent Treasury Regulations, at least one commentator surmised that Congress did not intend to encompass athletic
scholarships within the limitation provisions of S 117. See Chommie, supra note 33, at 375.
170. See Note, supra note 54, at 472-73.
171. See id.at 465.
172. Clurman & Reiner, supra note 22, at 153.
173. See supra note 168.
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increased criticism that failure to tax these grants is unfair to recipients of other
types of scholarships. Comparing athletic scholarships to other types of taxable
grants,"74 no reasonable argument exists to tax one and not the other.' 7 5 Permitting this disparate treatment allows one group of students to receive tax free
what another group just as deserving receives subject to taxation.' 76
Although the Service has not yet directly moved to tax athletic scholarships,
it has in recent years reinstated older rulings that disfavor scholarship recipients, 77 and has from time to time refused to issue any further private letter
rulings on the applicability of section 117.78 An analogous example of a trend
in reversing policies which could render section 117 exclusion less likely is the
Service's treatment of the National Direct Student Loan Program loan forgiveness feature. In 1974, the Service reversed a policy of fourteen years and
determined that these loan cancellations are includable in gross income.' 79 Such
reversals indicate that as section 117 exclusion becomes more strictly interpreted,
a reversal of the practice to not seek taxability of athletic scholarships is quite
possible.
Additionally, the movement of the Service against other areas of intercollegiate athletics may provide the impetus for a drive to tax athletic scholarships.
In recent years, the Service has declined to allow taxpayers to derive tax advantages from scholarships for purposes of income averaging. ' 8° Some suggestions have also surfaced concerning subjecting intercollegiate athletic programs
to the unrelated business income tax.' 8 ' More pertinent is a recent revenue
ruling that some contributions to a collegiate athletic program may not fall
within the charitable contribution deduction.' 8 2 Although the Service later rescinded the ruling pending the results of hearings on the matter,'8 3 the ruling
does indicate the Service's cognizance of the increased revenues of intercollegiate
athletic programs.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 123-68.
175. See supra text of paragraph accompanying note 168.
176. Accord Randall, supra note 34, at 309. An analysis of the constitutionality of this application
of the statute is beyond the scope of this paper. Briefly, due process requires the statute have a
rational relationship to a legitimate government end; equal protection requires that government
classifications also have a rational relationship to a legitimate government end. J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 404 (1978). For a discussion of a
statute's potential unconstitutionality due to discriminatory application, see generally id. at 527-35.
Another challenge has been that the quid pro quo scheme violates a student's civil rights because
students receiving these grants are being "enslaved and exploited." See Tipgos, supra note 53, at

546.
177. See, e.g., Savage, supra note 16, at 46.
178. See Myers & Hopkins, supra note 37, at 212 (in 1972, the service declined to issue further
such rulings); Tipgos, supra note 53, at 540. The procedure for requesting a ruling on the taxability
is illustrated in Rev. Proc. 68-11, 1968-1 C.B. 761. The procedure requires that the taxpayer
furnish the Service with "the terms and conditions subject to which the grant is paid" and a
description of any activity required "as a condition to receiving the grant." Id. at 762.
179. See Myers & Hopkins, supra note 37, at 215-16.
180. See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1461 & n.184. See also supra text accompanying notes 87100.
181. See generally Kaplan, supra note 2.
182. Rev. Rul. 84-132, 1984-2 C.B. 55.
183.

Charitable Contributions, supra note 4, at 116.
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The Confusion Surrounding the Area

Although section 117 exclusion determinations are most often conducted
under the quid pro quo analysis, this article has not yet addressed the propriety
of such scrutiny. Those who criticize the test assert that it contributes to the
state of uncertainty that was present before the enactment of the 1954 Code.' 4
The existence of different tests has given rise to inconsistent applications and
disparate results.185 Moreover, the regulations from which the quid pro quo test
arose 6 have been cited as not being of great value in determining the tax
87

status of a scholarship.1

The regulations also apparently undermine congressional intent-"r Although
exemptions from income are generally construed narrowly, the legislative history' 89
of section 117 indicates that Congress desired the scholarship exclusion to be
broad in nature.'19 However, the quid pro quo test results in broad inclusion in
income. This broad scope contributes to the continuation of the pre-1954 gift
vs. compensation test' 9' as well as the case-by-case approach' 92 that Congress
expressly sought to avoid.' 93 Perhaps a case-by-case approach in which elements
of compensation are sought for is best in light of the indefinite provisions of
section 117.1'9 In any event, because of the wide use of the quid pro quo test,
any resolution of the claim that this analysis undermines congressional intent
8 95
should probably come from Congress itself.

184. Sea Myers & Hopkins, supra note 37, at 213, 216; Phelan & Jones, supra note 41, at 96;
Note, supra note 54, at 461-62.
185. See Myers, supra note 35, at 23; Tipgos, supra note 53, at 539; Comment, supra note 17,
at 109.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
187. See Loring, supra note 26, at 160, 165; Comment, supra note 13, at 395. See also Myers,
supra note 35, at 20.
In a.. .case wherein the taxpayer contended that a stipend paid him was a fellowship
within the meaning of Section 117, a Minnesota District Court instructed the jury by
quoting the Regulations under that Section. After considerable deliberation, a jury, through
the marshal, queried the court as follows: 'What constitutes a fellowship - qualifications
and disqualifications?' It is doubtful if the judge's restatement of the Regulations in any
way satisfied the jurors' intellectual curiosity although the jury was able to reach a verdict.
Id. This confusion, however, can also be attributed to the poorly-drafted statute which gave rise
to the promulgation of the Treasury Regulations. See Stuart, supra note 10, at 363.
188. See Stuart, supra note 10, at 363; Comment, supra note 17, at 109. However, challenges
to tests deriving from the regulations have not been successful based on arguments that they
undermine congressional intent. See id.
189. See Note, supra note 54, at 457.
190. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
191. See M. CHAMBERS, supra note 20, at 78; J. FREELAND, supra note 51, at 145; Chommie,
supra note 13, at 395.
192. See Bingkr, 394 U.S. at 753; Chommie, supra note 33, at 376; Comment, supra note 17,
at 109.
193. See supra notes 10-22 and accompanying text.
194. See Note, supra note 54, at 473; 20 CASE W. REs. L_ REV. 493, 493 (1969).
195. Suggestions for remedial congressional action have been widely proposed. See Chommie,
supra note 33, at 377; Myers & Hopkins, supra note 37, at 216; Mylan, supra pnote 56, at 423;
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C.

A Solution to the Dilemma

In formulating a solution to this problem of exclusion, several general policies
will need to be considered. First, Congress should strive to provide the consistency and certainty which the enactment of section 117 failed to provide."
Moreover, Congress should continue to recognize the importance of scholarships
to the education of America's citizenry. 97 These policies cannot be upheld unless
both the Service and the courts acknowledge several more specific factors which
they have previously ignored.
A workable solution must address the realistic philosophical and social concerns inherent in this issue.' 98 Since 1954, scholarships which demand nothing
in return have become scarce.' 99 Educational institutions faced with budgetary
and resource proscriptions have been compelled to require certain services as
a condition for receiving a grant."° The "no-strings attached" definition of a
scholarship grant used by the Bingler court20' is anachronistic and unrealistic. 20 2
Therefore, the perception of scholarships as it appears in the Bingler decision
must be altered to comport with present-day realities. 211 Such realities include
the realization that athletes on scholarship aid the institution in gaining muchneeded additional funds. 204 From a policy perspective, taxing athletic scholarships
should not be a desirable goal.205 By enacting section 117 Congress has expressed
Randall, supra note 26, at 38; Randall, supra note 34, at 308-09; Savage, supra note 16, at 47;
Note, supra note 54, at 457; Comment, supra note 17, at 118; Comment, supra note 13, at 404.
196. See Randall, supra note 34-, at 309; Comment, supra note 10, at 329.
197. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
198. See M. CHAMBERS, supra note 20, at 79 (the Bingler decision ignores "broad philosophical
or social considerations"); Loring, supra note 26, at 167 (resolution needs to involve a "keen
understanding of academic life and of the operation of [these] tax exempt foundations"); Comment,
supra note 17, at 115-16 (resolution of this problem "must be based on an understanding of presentday educational realities").
199. Scholarships given as objects of charity have been popular for many years. M. CHAMBERS,
supra note 20, at 69. In 1956, one commentator asserted "normally services are not demanded in
return for a scholarship." Chommie, supra note 33, at 375. Today, however, this type of grant
accounts for only a very small number of scholarships awarded. See Tipgos, supra note 53, at 543.
200. This factor is discussed by Tipgos, supra note 53, at 538, in which the author states:
[I]nflation and the limits of resources have had a devastating effect on the plans and
programs of every institution throughout the world. For educational institutions... in this
country, inflation and the demand to upgrade the services offered have delivered a crippling
blow to available resources. Unfortunately, budgetary appropriations from the government
follow an inverse relationship with these financial constraints.
See also id. at 542. Additionally, increased appropriations at educational institutions do not appear
to be likely in this era of budget cuts and lowering of taxes. Compare Comment, 18 U.S.C. Section
1955. Who Conducts an Illegal Gambling Business? - It's Just a Roll of the Dice, 12 W. ST. U.L. REv.
239, 260 n.175 (1984) (discussing the effect of decreasing government appropriations in the criminal
prosecution area).
201. Bingler, 394 U.S. at 751.
202. See Tipgos, supra note 53, at 543.
203. See Loring, supra note 26, at 167; Tipgos, supra note 53, at 543.
204. For a discussion of the financial benefits which accrue to a university because of its
intercollegiate athletic program, see supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
205. Several commentators suggest that an active move to tax athletic scholarships would evoke
general dissatisfaction with 5 117. See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 1471 (quoting a congressional staff
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an understanding that scholarships are sufficiently unique to warrant special
treatment; 206 it should amend section 117 to provide for more liberal exemptions
for scholarships.
One possible solution would be to amend the limitation provisions for degreeseeking candidates 2 7 to provide that the scholarship exemption limitations apply
only to those grants which require some responsibility on the part of the student
after he acquires the degree. This would insure that compensation which parades
208
under the guise of a scholarship would not be exempt from taxable income.
Additionally, Congress should adopt the regulation definition of a scholarship 2°9
into the Code provision itself. A strong statement of legislative intent should
provide that no quid pro quo definitional hurdle need be overcome 210 before the
exemption provisions can be used, and should further express that the desire
to encourage higher education mandates these provisions be construed liber21 2
ally. 2 1 ' This will more clearly guide the courts in effectuating legislative intent.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The scholarship exemption provision began as an exemplary attempt to support higher education through encouragement of financial aid. 21 3 Although the
purpose of section 117 was ostensibly to provide clear-cut guidelines in an
uncertain area, 21 4 the Service and the courts have had to rely on ofttimes conflicting tests to effectuate congressional intent. 21 5 The Supreme Court decision
Bingkr v. Johnson has given rise to a quid pro quo inquiry which is currently
216
used to determine the applicability of section 117 exclusion.
The current de facto tax exemption of athletic scholarships poses critical
questions about the sustained vitality of section 117 quid pro quo analysis.

27
'

If

Congress desires to tax scholarships which extract a quid pro quo, then most
athletic scholarships should be taxable.2 18 If Congress does not desire to tax
these scholarships, it needs to reconsider the original basis for the provision.
member who asserted that "[just about every member of Congress either went to an NCAA school
or has one in his district....
Let's say they tend to be sympathetic to their athletic interests");
Randall, supra note 26, at 39; Randall, supra note 34, at 309. The recent revenue ruling denying
the charitable contribution deduction to some funds given to an intercollegiate athletic program
evoked an analogous outcry. See Charitale Contribudons, supra note 4, at 116.
206. See Note, supra note 10, at 306-07.
207. See I.R.C. $ 117(bX1) (West 1985).
208. This would uphold congressional concern that compensation be taxable. See supra note 20
and accompanying text.
209. See Treas. Reg. S 1.117-3(a) (West 1985).
210. See supra text accompanying note 75.
211. &e supra text accompanying note 22.
212.' See Bingler, 394 U.S. at 752 (the Supreme Court found that the "legislative history underlying S 117 is .. .far from clear").
213. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 68-74.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 124-68.
218. 6e supra text accompanying note 169.
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Congress may determine that it should now more specifically define the parameters of section 117 to provide for more liberal treatment of scholarships." 9
The prevailing exemption of athletic scholarships, however, is difficult to harmonize with the framework of section 117 analysis as it currently stands.

219.

See supra text accompanying notes 198-212.
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